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There is a growing realisation that the populace need to be consulted on a more regular basis about issues
that concern them. We address a particular economic problem, that of national budgeting, and show how
digital technology can be applied in an understandable way in this domain. The current situation is that
governments are reluctant to conduct plebiscites due to the expenses inherent in the traditional voting
model. Handivote is a system which allows maximal participation, using a ubiquitous input mechanism,
the mobile phone, to support decision-making. In this paper we show how the Handivote system could be
extended to invite voter input into national economic decisions. Our proposal includes an algorithm which
maximises voter satisfaction in the presence of budgetary constraints, and the preferences revealed by the
vote.
Handivote, Electronic Voting, Digital Economy
1. INTRODUCTION
National Government constitutes roughly 35% of the
economy in the UK (Dye & Sosimi (2009)) . Most
research into digital economy focuses on the e-
commerce sector which constitutes only 7% of the UK
economy (WebDezign (2009)). There is clearly a need
to start considering how to apply digital technology to the
relationship between citizens and the government, which
constitutes such a large slice of the economy.
In previous papers (Renaud & Cockshott (2009b,a))
we have shown how it is possible to organise secure
and anonymous electronic voting. The voters register
their plebiscite votes by mobile or landline phone. The
plebiscites we’ve focused on generally have yes/no
alternatives such as:
• Should smoking in public be banned?
• Should the UK get out of the Afghan war?
• Should Scotland be independent?
In this paper we extend the analysis to the more
complex issues that arise with complex and conflicting
demands on budgetary policy. We will show that it
is possible to set up electronic voting systems that
allow the public to make decisions on issues of tax
and public expenditure, even though they perhaps do
not understand the minutiae of the dependencies and
conflicts that are involved in making these decisions.
Such plebiscites differ from the classical subjects of
plebiscites in that:
1. The decisions to be made are not binary but involve
a range of possible options. For example, should
public library expenditure go up by 1%, 2%, ..., 6%
etc. This means that the results of the vote have to
be expressed in numeric terms rather than as just
a majority based “yes” or “no”.
2. There are multiple different issues to be decided
on. For example, they could be items of public
expenditure which require adjusting and balancing:
schools, hospitals, the Navy, pensions, etc.
This means that the decision problem is multi-
dimensional in the strict sense. This implies that
the result of the decision must not only be
numerical but must be a vector of numbers.
3. There are functional dependencies between items
that can be voted on. Suppose the topics to be
decided on are the public expenditure headings
given above along with the tax rates for VAT, basic
income tax, higher rate income tax and tobacco
tax. This is not only a multidimensional problem,
but it must be ensured that the change in taxes is
sufficient to finance the change in expenditure.
Each of these problems will be considered in turn,
resulting in the proposal of a model that can handle all of
them.
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2. THE HANDIVOTE SYSTEM
We first proposed a procedure for electronic plebiscites
in Renaud & Cockshott (2007). A summary of the
procedure is included here for the sake of clarity. The
voting takes place in three distinct stages: registration,
voting and verification.
1. Voters register, in person, presenting a recognised
form of identification to the registration officers. A
record of their registration is taken to ensure they
do not register multiple times.
2. They then choose a sealed envelope from a jar.
The envelope contains a voter card that looks like a
credit card. The voter card contains a SIM chip, and
has printed on it two numbers, a voter ID number
and a PIN. Note that only the voter him or herself
will know which voter ID number is associated to
him or her.
3. When the voting period commences, the citizen
can use this card to place a vote. The vote can
be placed either at the polls, or via a number
of electronic channels. In all cases the voter ID
number and the PIN have to be used, either
manually or by automatic readout from the SIM,
to tag the vote. Only correct combinations of ID
and PIN will be registered as valid votes. Note that
since only the citizen him or herself knows which ID
number is on the card, the voting process remains
anonymous until voting has concluded.
4. Votes are counted electronically and the final
result published. After the voting has closed, the
voter is able to verify that his or her vote has
been recorded correctly, Because the entire list of
voter ID numbers registered for the YES and NO
alternatives is published (on the web and in the
press). This allows:
• Citizens to check that their vote was correctly
registered.
• Anyone with access to the published list of
votes can verify that the count was correctly
performed.
The procedure we proposed had a number of checks
and balances to ensure that votes were counted
correctly and that the entire process was as transparent
as possible.
To summarise, the principles of our voting process are:
1. Voters shall choose a random voter card when they
present their identification to the electoral office
and this identification matches the name on the
voters roll. This ensures that only eligible voters
vote and that they can vote anonymously.
2. Voters may place their vote using a variety of
devices including mobile phones, landline phones,
public phones and the polling booths. This lowers
barriers to participation and mobility of voters.
3. An electronic re-vote on a particular voter card
number will void the previous vote if it is different
from the original vote. This discourages voter card
theft.
4. Lists of voter cards together with votes cast are
made publicly available once the election period
has concluded. This provides the transparency
often lacking in current e-voting processes. It is
also possible for any voter to check the accuracy of
the count. It also ensures that no person or group
will know the intermediate outcome and have time
to mount a massive coercion-based attack to swing
the outcome of the plebiscite. Lauer argues that
having a voter verified audit trail is the only effective
countermeasure against a number of electronic
voting threats Lauer (2005).
5. Finally, our system is characterised by the
simplicity of the voting process. Voters either put
the voter card into a voting machine and choose
an option from the display, or contact the voting line
by phone, provide their card number and PIN, and
choose an option. There are no complicated extra
steps involved as is the case for other e-voting
schemes.
The Rowntree Reform Trust’s report Purity of Elections in
the UK: Causes for Concern Wilks-Heeg (2008) stated
that: “e-voting pilots have proved extremely expensive
and there is no evidence to suggest that e-voting offers
any significant scope for turnout to be increased by this
means. At the same time, serious concerns persist about
the security and transparency of e-voting systems and
their vulnerability to organised fraud”
Concerns were particularly raised about e-counting:
“Not only has e-counting frequently failed to improve
on the estimated time required for a manual count, it
has also highlighted the lack of transparency in such
a system”. Furthermore, they point out that there were
42 convictions for electoral fraud between 2000 and
2007. Moreover, every English police force except the
City of London has investigated electoral malpractice
allegations since the year 2000. Finally, there were
concerns about the credibility of the voters roll, with
many voters not being registered and postal voting has
been shown to be open to wide-spread abuse.
Does Handivote offer a viable alternative to existing
systems? We believe that it does. Let us consider the
problems highlighted by this report:
Increasing turnout By offering voters an opportunity
to vote from their phone, mobile phone or public
phone, we lower the bar. It makes voting as
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convenient as placing a phone call, and removes
the need for voters to visit polling stations.
Transparency The verification phase included in our
proposal allows voters to verify that their vote was
recorded correctly, from the comfort of their own
homes; either on the TV or via the Web.
Expense Our scheme requires voters’ cards to be
produced. Once this is done, existing devices will
be able to read the embedded chip, removing the
need for expensive devices to be purchased.
Coercion If a voter is coerced to place a vote which
was not intended, he or she can simply visit the
polling stations and vote there. This vote replaces
the earlier vote.
Vulnerability to organised fraud Our system is able to
provide some resistance. If two votes are cast
using the same voter card number, the original vote
is voided, hence the person who has attempted to
break into the system will not have his or her vote
counted.
E-counting problems Problems in the Scottish elec-
tions of 2007 occurred because votes were
recorded manually and then scanned into a sys-
tem to be electronically counted. This was bound
to be a problem since people became confused
and recorded their votes incorrectly. Furthermore,
handwriting variety led to the software being un-
able to recognise numerals.
Handivote, as it stands, caters for standard plebiscites.
The following section outlines the proposed extension
of Handivote to support voter input on multidimensional
issues.
3. NUMERIC OUTCOMES
In a standard plebiscite people vote “yes” or “no” and
whichever gets the greater number of votes triumphs. We
have shown how this schema could be securely mapped
onto a procedure involving sending text messages to
a single number. There is another way of viewing this
procedure as one which first computes a rational number
and then thresholds it. Suppose we have yes= +1 and
no = −1, then the total vote V is calculated as:
V =
∑n
i=1 vi
n
(1)
Where n is the number of votes cast and vi ranges
over the individual votes. This number V is in the range
−1..1and we declare the result a yes vote if V > 0.
It is clear that one can extend this view of standard
plebiscites to obtain numerical outcomes from a vote.
Suppose there are 3 telephone numbers that you can
text for a vote on library expenditure:
• xxx xxx0 means reduce it by 5%,
• xxx xxx1 means leave it unchanged and
• xxx xxx2 means increase it by 5%
It is clear that by applying the method in Equation 1 we
can obtain a value of V that is a numeric percentage
change in library expenditure. The result is the average
of what the voters want. This will, in our case, be
bounded by -5% to +5%, but these bounds could be
varied by those setting the vote, and, at the cost of
some slight increase in complexity, a broader range of
numbers to dial could be provided without changing the
basic procedure.
4. MULTIDIMENSIONAL OUTCOMES
Now suppose that there are three items to be decided
on: local council tax, school expenditure and library
expenditure. A simple extension would be to set up
phone numbers for voting as follows:
Phone number Topic Change
xxx xx00 Council tax down 5%
xxx xx01 Council tax leave as is
xxx xx02 Council tax up 5%
xxx xx10 Libraries down 5%
xxx xx11 Libraries leave as is
xxx xx12 Libraries up 5%
xxx xx20 Schools down 5%
xxx xx21 Schools leave as is
xxx xx22 Schools up 5%
People could then text in to express their personal
decisions. The result of applying the procedure in
equation 1 to this would be to obtain a vector result V
each of whose elements was a numerical outcome for a
particular topic Vo the vote on council tax, V1 on libraries
etc.
It should not be necessary for voters to express their
opinion on all possible issues under consideration. They
should be allowed to vote only on those issues that they
are most concerned about or those that affect them.
As long as sufficient people vote on each individual
issue, the law of large numbers means that will get
a reasonably accurate estimate of public opinion on
that topic. Surowiechi (2005) shows that an opinion
aggregated from many non-experts is usually superior
to that of a few experts.
5. FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCIES
If we consider the example given in section 4, there
is no guarantee that the proposed changes to tax
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and expenditure would be compatible. It is likely that
people will vote for increases in expenditure but not vote
sufficient tax increases to cover this. How can this be
handled?
Let us first consider a simple case in which there are
only two topics being voted: schools and taxes. Suppose
that the vote was [4, 2] indicating a 4% increase in
school expenditure and only a 2% increase in taxes
to cover it (let us make the simplifying assumption for
now that schools are the sole form of expenditure).
Figure 1 shows the average vote at position [4,2]
and also a diagonal line representing the feasible
combinations of expenditure and tax. The best choice
given the constraints is labeled ’compromise’. This is
the point on the feasible set closest to the selected
vote: expenditure is a little lower and tax has risen a
little more than people chose in the absence of the
functional dependency. In our practical example this will
be the point [3,3] which is a 3% increase in tax and a
similar increase in expenditure. Whilst this might seem
an obvious averaging compromise, it can be obtained by
the following geometric steps:
1. Obtain the unit vector in the direction of the
feasibility set. In our case since we have a 45
degree line as the feasibility set, the unit vector will
be [ 1√
2
, 1√
2
].
2. Project the point chosen by the voters onto this unit
vector, obtaining the distance along the unit vector
at which a line normal from it will pass through the
vote point. This projection can be done using an
inner product operation [ 1√
2
, 1√
2
].[4, 2] which gives
4√
2
+ 2√
2
= 6√
2
.
3. Convert from a distance along the vector to
a position in the original coordinate space by
multiplying the unit 45 degree vector by the
distance [ 1√
2
, 1√
2
]× 6√
2
= [3, 3].
We illustrated this using a two dimensional system, but
for a general n dimensional case were there are l taxes
an m expenditure items, and n = m + l there will be a
linear constraint of the form
m∑
i=1
Viai =
l∑
j=1
Vjbj (2)
where the ai represent share of total expenditure going
on item i and bj is the share of total income obtained
by tax j. This constraint defines an n − 1 dimensional
sub manifold F that constitutes the feasible set. The
best compromise, given the vote will be the point of
intersection between F and the line normal to F passing
through V.
vote
feasible set
compromise
expenditure
tax
Figure 1: Choosing between two functionally constrained
options.
We can extend the 2D method of finding the closest
point for the general case of budgetary constraints as
follows. Given an equation for the plane of the form
a1x1 + a2x2 + ... + anxn = 0 ( we have combined the
ais and bis in equation 2). We define the normal vector
N = [a1, a2, ...., an] (3)
and let V be the vote point. We wish to find the
compromise point C on the feasibility set closest to the
vote point.
Let n be the normalised version of N , i.e., the vector of
unit length going in the same direction as N . The closest
point in the plane to the given point V is on the line
which passes through V and which is perpendicular to
the plane. Since the line is perpendicular to the plane,
the normal vector of the plane gives the directional vector
of the line. The equation of the line must thus be :
L(k) = V + kn (4)
for some real parameter k. We find k by doing a dot
product with the normal unit vector thus : k = V.n. Then
subtract kn from V to obtain the point on the plane.
C = V − kn (5)
C is then the best compromise vote given the budgetary
constraints.
It should be noted that our optimisation procedure
implicitly uses a Euclidean metric, by virtue of its use of
inner product operator. It could be questioned whether a
Euclidean metric is appropriate in this economic context
Cockshott (2009). It is possible that some sort of L1 or
Minkowski metric is strictly more appropriate. However,
this is a rather abstruse mathematical point and is
unlikely to give radically different results from the more
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familiar Euclidean metric. One has to bear in mind that
if experiments with this sort of voting are carried out, it
will be necessary to explain to politicians and to voters
how the compromise mechanism works. This can be
done relatively easily with the sort of example shown
in Figure 1 which uses simple planar geometry of the
sort an educated non-mathematician can understand.
Attempting to explain Minkowski metrics to politicians is
probably best avoided.
6. SOCIAL ASPECTS
One of the most basic requirements of any voting
system is that it should be understandable by all
sectors of the population. Paper-based voting has
this understandability and electronic voting proposals
struggle to meet this requirement. The one aspect of
multidimensional voting that will be core to its success
is its understandability and acceptability to the public at
large. No politician will undersign any voting system that
could cost them votes.
The Scottish elections of 2007 are a prime example of a
too-complicated system. Voters were given two sheets:
on one they were requested to place a cross next to only
one candidate. On the other they had to rate various
candidates. The result was a fiasco, with 140 000 votes
being discarded.
Some researchers mention the acceptability aspect
in their publications. Costa et al. (2005) argue that
acceptability will be based on the usability and
trust the populace place in the system. Xenakis &
Macintosh (2005) argue that if security is enhanced
then acceptance will result. Other researchers are more
concerned with the acceptability of the scheme to the
public body than to the individual voter (Bouras et al.
(2003)).
Schaupp & Carter (2005) carried out a study to
determine which factors did influence acceptability of
electronic voting systems. The factors they identified
included the trust aspect, as argued by Costa et al., but
also highlighted the influence of perceived usefulness
and compatibility. The former relates to the extent to
which the individual voter believes that the use of the
electronic voting system will allow them to participate
in the election process more efficiently. Compatibility
relates to the person’s previous experiences. For
example, if the system in question were an online voting
system, then previous use of the Web for e-commerce
or other tasks would pre-dispose the person to use
the same mechanism for voting. Schaupp and Carter’s
model did not list ease of use as one of the influential
factors but they admit that their sample was composed
of relatively expert computer users and that this factor
was unlikely to be relevant for such a population Indeed
Carter & Belanger (2005) did identify ease of use as
being an influential factor, also confirming the roles of
trustworthiness and compatibility. Storer et al. Storer
et al. (2006) found that convenience, mobility and
verification were important to voters. The first two could
arguably be classified as being related to usefulness and
the latter is directly related to trust.
These, then, are the aspects we need to focus on to
maximise acceptability of multidimensional voting:
• Trust — this has two aspects: trust in the
government and trust in the voting system. The
former is not a function of the voting system and
so we need to ensure that the voting system itself
engenders sufficient trust. However, if voters are
concerned that the way they voted could be held
against them at a later date, the Handivote system
becomes particularly attractive since there is no
link between the voter and the vote. Handivote has
been designed with specific features to provide
feedback throughout the process specifically to
show concerned voters exactly what the underlying
processes are, and how their votes have been
stored and counted.
• Ease of use — we have to ensure that the
casting of a vote is as simple as possible. The
requirements for interacting with the system will
have to be very clear. However, multidimensional
voting is clearly different from the way many voters
will have voted in the past and there is no track
record which could be consulted to guide our
efforts. Therefore we will have to carry out a
number of pilot studies to uncover the problems
and work towards addressing them in order to
make the process as usable as possible.
• Usefulness — facilitating voting by mobile phone
ensures that voters are no longer bound by
geographical or time constraints so the usefulness
of this system should be obvious to voters.
• Compatibility — in the UK mobile phone saturation
is over 100% (Deans (2008)) so there should not
be any resistance to the use of the phone based
on people’s familiarity with the device.
It should be noted that the electorate does not need to
understand the how the underlying averaging algorithms
work in order to participate. These algorithms will,
of course, be made public so that those who do
have the required mathematical skills and interest
can validate them. The program that performs the
calculations should be released as open source code
via recognised dissemination websites. The individual
voter only needs to be concerned with expressing an
individual preference, no more and no less.
Every voter can be expected to manage his or her own
household budget, deciding how to spend the money
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each month. The ideal way to present this to the voters
is to build on the budgeting metaphor, and not to focus
on the complicated underlying maths. For example: a
council wants the electorate to participate in deciding
whether more or less money should be spent on schools
and libraries. Moreover, they should also decide whether
council tax should be raised to support the initiatives. In
this way the reality of the council’s budgetary constraints
is brought home to the individual voter, possibly the
greatest benefit of this scheme.
The result of the vote would be presented as: the
electorate chose to increase council tax by 2% in order
to increase funding to schools by 3% and funding to
libraries by 1%. All that is involved here is the concept
of averaging and majority decisions, a familiar paradigm.
The other notion is of prioritisation, which already exists
in traditional party list voting systems.
7. SECURITY ISSUES
This proposal raises the issue of whether a person
should indeed be allowed to vote for more than one
topic?
One alternative would be that individual voters should
be able to cast as many votes as there topics being
decided, so they would have 3 in our example. Another
alternative would be that each voter should have only
one vote which they cast on the single topic that most
concerns them.
Whichever alternative is chosen, the voting software is
going to have to tally up how many votes each voter has
cast. It is obvious that no voter can be allowed to register
multiple votes on the same topic. A parent should not
be able to vote 3 times to raise school expenditure by
5%. One could either invalidate any subsequent votes
cast on topic x by voter yyyyy, or take the last vote cast
as final, but this may raise interesting issues relating to
stolen card numbers. We have previously argued that in
an ordinary plebiscite the best option is to invalidate any
vote that is part of a set of inconsistent votes cast using
the same registration number. This both allows a voter to
partially correct a mistake in voting the first time, and also
provides an deterrent against stealing card numbers.
Any attempt to use a stolen card number which clashes
with the original decision of the voter will be invalidated,
thus limiting the gain to be made from attempting to
cast duplicate votes. We think that the same argument
applies to multi-dimensional referenda.
7.1. Incorrect tax or expenditure data
The proposal to take a vote on budgetary issues
and then move to a compromise position compatible
with a balanced budget is open to a subtle form of
manipulation. If we assume that it is unlikely that the
popular vote will be exactly on the feasible hyperplane,
and that it will have to be nudged over onto the
hyperplane, then the chancellor of the exchequer could
in principle manipulate the outcome of the vote by
misreporting the share of government revenue raised by
various taxes.
Suppose people can vote on 2 taxes: VAT, income tax.
Suppose that in fact VAT raises 25% of govt revenue and
income tax 75%. If the electorate votes for a 4% rise
in expenditure and a 1% rise in VAT and a 3% rise in
income tax, then the compromise position by equation 5
should be :
VAT Income Tax Expenditure
1.23% 3.69% 3.08%
But suppose that the chancellor dishonestly states that
VAT raises 50% of revenue, and the voters make the
same choice, then the compromise position will be
worked out at:
VAT Income Tax Expenditure
1.67% 3.67% 2.67%
In other words the increase in expenditure will be smaller
because he has overstated the share of revenue raised
by an unpopular tax. Thus manipulation of data on
tax returns could enable the government to tailor the
result of a vote. Effectively what they would be doing is
adjusting the slope of the hyperplane representing the
balanced budget. This sort of manipulation shades off
into the general question of the reliability and honesty
of official statistics and whether these are subject to
political manipulation.
7.2. Non-linearities
Our model implicitly assumes a linear response of
tax income to changes in rates. This assumption is
probably false for real economies Gruber & Saez (2002);
Giavazzi et al. (2000). However a non-linear function can
usually be approximated reasonably well by locally linear
segments. If the marginal changes made to taxation as
the result of a vote are relatively small, the locally linear
approximation is likely to be good enough. One should
also consider that the existing process by which the
treasury arrives at tax and expenditure levels will itself
be based on similar approximations.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has described the extension of the Handivote
system to facilitate a new kind of social decision making,
where multidimensional issues are involved. We have
described the mechanism and detailed algorithms for
supporting this. This potentially allows the extension
of democratic participation by means of the latest
informatics technologies.
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